Warsaw, February 19, 2025

On the Mechanism for Strengthening Europe’s Defence Identity

The decision of Donald Trump to initiate direct negotiations with Vladimir Putin regarding the end of the war in Ukraine—excluding the European Union and, de facto, Ukraine itself—as well as the anti-European speech by Vice President J.D. Vance in Munich, has shocked the vast majority of EU member states. This has triggered an urgent search for effective measures to reinforce Europe’s defence identity. The proposal presented below focuses on a mechanism (through a separate international agreement outside the EU’s founding Treaties) that would enable the establishment of a European Defence Union, bringing together states committed to strengthening Europe’s defence identity. This initiative would remain open to Ukraine and ensure its maximum security against the Russian aggressor.

1. The statements and actions of President Donald Trump, along with speeches delivered by senior representatives of his administration during the Munich Conference (February 14-15 this year), outlined Washington’s concept for ending the war in Ukraine. The peace “deal” envisioned by Washington entails Ukraine’s loss of the territories currently occupied by Russia and the renunciation of its NATO membership aspirations.

It was announced that in potential peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, the United States would act as the sole mediator, with no European representatives involved. The justification provided for this approach was that the excessive number of participants in the Minsk negotiations had rendered the agreements ineffective.

This claim is a blatant distortion of facts. The Minsk I and Minsk II agreements failed not due to the number of negotiating parties, but because Moscow refused to abide by the agreements it had itself accepted.

2. President Trump has never condemned Putin for his aggression against Ukraine or the war crimes committed there. All indications suggest that he intends to lift the freeze on and refrain from confiscating Russian Federation financial assets and those of oligarchs linked to Putin, as he has already ordered the dissolution of the special unit responsible for these measures. He has also announced plans to develop comprehensive relations with Russia, even hinting that in the distant future, Ukraine might become part of the Russian Federation.

Washington expects European armed forces to protect the separation line between Ukrainian and Russian troops—without the involvement of American soldiers. Furthermore, European contingents participating in such a peacekeeping mission would not be covered by the security guarantees of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Without consulting allies or informing Kyiv in advance, Trump initiated direct contact with Putin, a man accused of war crimes. The Rubio-Lavrov talks in Saudi Arabia are re-establishing U.S.-Russia relations and paving the way for a summit meeting—without any concessions from Moscow. The Trump administration is effectively bringing an end to Putin’s international isolation.

3. Washington’s position places Ukraine, the other NATO member states, as well as the European Union and its member states, in an extremely difficult situation. Poland, as a country bordering Ukraine—where the war continues—and Belarus, which is acting as a co-aggressor, finds itself in a state of direct threat.

President Trump has taken actions without consulting NATO. The European Union has been entirely bypassed, reinforcing the notion that the U.S. president, much like Putin, disregards the EU and seeks to weaken or divide it. The credibility of the fundamental pillar of Europe’s security architecture—the effectiveness of the American security umbrella—has been undermined.

Ukraine has been treated as a mere object of negotiations, despite President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ongoing efforts to maintain direct communication with President Trump.

4. After Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union demonstrated exceptional determination and unity in its response. It condemned the aggressor and the war crimes committed, while providing Ukraine with financial, economic, and military assistance. As a result of Russia’s aggression and the ongoing war, the necessity of strengthening Europe’s (EU’s) defence identity in the field of security and defence policy became clear and urgent.

Now, in light of President Trump’s stance on the war in Ukraine, this issue has become even more pressing. The European Union will most likely have to assume the primary burden of supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia.

The transatlantic crisis has not caused panic among Europe’s top political leaders. On the contrary—as evidenced by the meeting in Paris on February 17—it has strengthened their determination and resolve for collective action.

5. Ukraine requires strong and unequivocal guarantees that it will remain a sovereign state—especially in light of President Trump’s opposition to Ukraine’s NATO membership. In this context, the European Union has a crucial role to play.

Europe will only be able to co-determine Ukraine’s future and effectively counter Putin’s aggression and its consequences if the EU assumes full responsibility for providing economic, financial, and military assistance to Ukraine.

6. The EU Treaties provide a solid institutional framework for such actions. However, the decision-making process requires improvements, particularly by expanding the use of qualified majority voting (QMV), especially in matters related to sanctions.

Work is already underway to leverage these possibilities, including:

• Defining strategic directions – A Commission report on this matter is set to be published in mid-March. Ongoing efforts focus on modifying the Strategic Compass, improving planning, standardization, and information exchange in EU-NATO cooperation, among other aspects.
• Ensuring adequate financial resources – Discussions are ongoing about incorporating defence expenditures into the core EU budget and exploring alternative financing mechanisms. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has proposed establishing a dedicated defence bank, while discussions in Paris have explored various forms of bank involvement.
• Strengthening defence industry cooperation – The European Defence Agency (EDA) serves as a key instrument in this area.
• Enhancing the common defence market –several critical EU regulatory measures to support this objective.
• Advancing joint innovation research – The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism remains an available but underutilized tool for defence-related R&D.
• Defining a “common defence policy” – The long-term goal being the establishment of a “common defence” framework.

7. From our perspective, the mechanism for establishing “common defence” is of central importance. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides legal grounds for member states to establish a common defence policy under Article 42(2). However, this requires unanimous agreement among all member states and ratification at the national level.

The Treaty also includes a mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7)), which is similar in content to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty:

“In the event that a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have an obligation to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”

However, some member states—particularly Viktor Orbán’s Hungary—effectively serve Russian interests, making unified action in this domain highly unlikely.

Nevertheless, alternative avenues remain open. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operates under an intergovernmental framework, meaning that member states retain considerable flexibility in this area.

8. The development of European integration has, at times of historic turning points, required decisive action by a group of the most committed member states, operating outside the framework of the Communities/Union. This approach has been used successfully in the past:

• In the mid-1980s, the Schengen Agreement was concluded, laying the foundation for today’s Schengen Area.
• In the mid-2010s, the Prüm Convention was established, significantly strengthening counterterrorism efforts.
• The financial crisis led to the conclusion of two major intergovernmental agreements: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)—both crucial for ensuring the stability of the eurozone.

Today, European integration faces another defining challenge. It is therefore possible to once again apply the “Schengen method.”

There is no legal obstacle, nor would it violate the principle of EU loyalty, for member states committed to supporting Ukraine to conclude an international treaty parallel to the EU’s founding treaties. This treaty could establish a European Defence Union, and might be formally titled the “Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Union.”

9. Without preempting the outcome of negotiations on the detailed provisions of such a Treaty, its core elements can already be outlined. The Treaty should regulate three key areas:

1. Fundamental provisions:

• A mutual assistance clause, similar to Article 42(7) TEU, ensuring collective defence commitments among member states.
• Emphasis on the importance of transatlantic relations and a guarantee of close cooperation with NATO to maintain strategic alignment.
• Institutional structure and competencies of the European Defence Union, defining its governance, decision-making mechanisms, and coordination with national defence policies.
• Financing of the European Defence Union, establishing budgetary contributions, financial instruments, and potential funding mechanisms, ensuring sustainability and effectiveness.

2. Guaranteeing compliance with the EU principle of loyalty:

• Clause respecting EU competences, ensuring that the establishment of the European Defence Union does not undermine or contradict the competences and policies of the European Union.
• Close interdependence with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), ensuring alignment with existing EU security and defence initiatives.
• Scope of involvement of EU institutions, bodies, and agencies, defining how existing EU structures (such as the European Defence Agency, European External Action Service, and the EU Military Staff) can be leveraged within the European Defence Union.
• Explicit linkage with key EU policy areas, particularly in financing, the European Defence Agency (EDA), and the common defence market, ensuring coherence with EU economic, industrial, and security strategies.

3. Flexibility (openness) clause, defining the eligibility criteria for participation in the European Defence Union:

• EU member states expressing their willingness to join the European Defence Union.
• NATO member states that are not part of the EU but wish to participate in the initiative.
• Candidate countries for EU membership that seek to align with the European Defence Union and contribute to its objectives.

10. The flexibility (openness) clause is of fundamental importance for guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. Beyond enabling the United Kingdom, Norway, and Turkey to join the European Defence Union, Ukraine itself would be covered by the Treaty’s provisions—and thus protected under the mutual assistance clause.

In this context, the crucial objective remains the radical strengthening of Europe’s defence identity in response to Russian aggression, relations with the Trump administration, and the imperative of safeguarding Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Signed: The Conference of (former) Ambassadors of the Republic of Poland

The Conference of (former) Ambassadors of the Republic of Poland is an association of former representatives of the Republic of Poland, dedicated to analyzing foreign policy, identifying emerging threats to Poland, and providing strategic recommendations. Our mission is to reach a broad public audience and contribute to informed discussions on Poland’s international standing.

We are united by our shared experience in shaping Poland’s role as a modern European state and a significant member of the Transatlantic Community. We firmly believe that foreign policy should serve the interests of Poland as a whole, rather than those of the ruling party.

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Thanks to Monika Wrzosek-Müller to suggest this text for publication